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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 This appeal involves a putative class action brought by 
consumers from six states alleging that Appellants-
Defendants Volvo Cars of North America, LLC and Volvo 
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Car Corporation (collectively “Volvo”) sold certain vehicles 
with defective sunroof drainage systems.  Volvo challenges 
the grant of class certification by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
Plaintiffs-Appellees Joanne Neale, Keri Hay, Kelly 
McGary, Svein Berg, Gregory Burns, David Taft, Jeffrey 
Kruger, and Karen Collopy (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed 
suit on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of current 
and former Volvo vehicle owners and lessees.  Plaintiffs 
allege that a uniform design defect exists in the sunroof 
drainage systems in the following vehicles sold and leased to 
consumers by Volvo: S40, S60, S80, and V70 (model years 
2004 to present); XC90 (model years 2003 to present); and 
V50 (model years 2005 to present) (the “Class Vehicles”). 
On August 7, 2012, Plaintiffs proposed a nationwide 
class consisting of “[a]ll persons or entities in the United 
States who are current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the ‘Nationwide Class’).”  Supplemental 
Appendix (“SA”) 19; Joint Appendix (“JA”) 140.  In the 
alternative, Plaintiffs also proposed the following statewide 
classes: 
All persons or entities in Massachusetts who 
are current or former owners and/or lessees of 
a Class Vehicle (the “Massachusetts Class”). 
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All persons or entities in Florida who are 
current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the “Florida Class”). 
All persons or entities in Hawaii who are 
current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the “Hawaii Class”). 
All persons or entities in New Jersey who are 
current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the “New Jersey Class”). 
All persons or entities in California who are 
current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the “California Class”). 
All persons or entities in Maryland who are 
current or former owners and/or lessees of a 
Class Vehicle (the “Maryland Class”). 
SA 20; see also JA 140–41 (Pls.’ Second Am. Compl. listing 
all classes except for the Maryland Class).  Volvo filed a brief 
in opposition to the proposed classes and separate motions for 
summary judgment against the individual class 
representatives.     
On March 26, 2013, the District Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide class, granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion to certify six statewide classes, and denied 
Volvo’s motions for summary judgment.  After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 
1426 (2013), Volvo moved for reconsideration of the District 
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Court’s order granting class certification, which the District 
Court also denied.  Volvo filed this timely appeal. 
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (d)(6) and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs asserted federal jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).  Pub. L. No. 109–2, 
119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  
CAFA confers on district courts original jurisdiction where: 
(1) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, as 
aggregated across all individual claims; (2) there are 
minimally diverse parties; and (3) the class consists of at least 
100 or more members.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B), (6); 
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348 
(2013).  
Although the parties do not dispute CAFA jurisdiction, 
“[w]e must nevertheless satisfy ourselves that federal subject 
matter jurisdiction exists in the first instance.”  Kaufman v. 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2009).  “In 
order to determine whether the CAFA jurisdictional 
requirements are satisfied, a court evaluates allegations in the 
complaint.”  Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 
F.3d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 2014).  Plaintiffs contend that there 
were over 100 class members because there were “tens of 
thousands” of Class Vehicles sold in the United States.  JA 
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107, 141–42, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 127.  As to the 
amount in controversy, Plaintiffs allege that class members 
“suffered economic damages including but not limited to 
costly repairs, loss of vehicle use, substantial loss in value 
and resale value of the vehicles, and other related damages,” 
JA 148, ¶ 148, that they are seeking punitive damages and 
attorney’s fees and costs, and that this exceeds $5,000,000.  
Finally, because one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens 
of different states, Plaintiffs contend that there is minimal 
diversity.  Volvo answered that the jurisdictional allegations 
stated “a legal conclusion to which no response [was] 
necessary,” but to the extent “a response is deemed required, 
Volvo admits the allegations in this paragraph.”  JA 170, Am. 
Answer ¶ 5. 
Because Volvo did not contest these jurisdictional 
facts, we ask “whether it is clear to a legal certainty that the 
plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.”  Judon, 773 
F.3d at 505.  As in Frederico v. Home Depot, we have an idea 
of each class representative’s damages but not the total 
number of class members.  507 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Using class representative Gregory Burns as an example, he 
was charged $252.82 to repair his damaged vehicle.  As a 
citizen of New Jersey, he can seek punitive damages of up to 
five times the compensatory damages, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:15-5.14(b).  Thus, an estimate of his total damages 
amounts to $1,516.92.  A median recovery range for 
attorney’s fees is approximately 30 percent, which would be 
$455.08 for Burns’ claim.  Burns’ damages plus attorney’s 
fees would equal $1,972.  The $5,000,000 CAFA amount-in-
controversy requirement divided by $1,972 equals 
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U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
“We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Grandalski 
v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 354 
(3d Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
review de novo a legal standard applied by a district court.  
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. 
 Volvo argues on appeal that: (1) putative members of 
the class have not suffered an injury and therefore lack 
Article III standing; (2) the District Court failed to identify 
the class claims and defenses in its certification order; (3) the 
District Court erred in its analysis of the Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance requirement; and (4) the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend means that Plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
approximately 2,536 class members.  Because 2,536 is well 
under the number of Class Vehicles identified in the Second 
Amended Complaint (“tens of thousands”), we are satisfied 
that the “legal certainty test is met: as it does not appear to a 
legal certainty that [Plaintiffs] cannot recover the 
jurisdictional amount, the case need not be remanded and we 
may proceed to the substantive merits of this appeal.”  See 
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 199.  
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must have class-wide proof of damages in order for the class 
to be certified.  We address each issue in turn.  
A. 
Volvo argues that all putative class members must 
have Article III standing.  We begin with this argument 
because “[w]e have ‘an obligation to assure ourselves’ of 
litigants’ standing under Article III.”  DaimlerChrysler Corp. 
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) (quoting Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 180 (2000)); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 
790, 798 (5th Cir. 2014).  We exercise plenary review over a 
threshold question of law, such as that presented by an Article 
III standing challenge.  McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 
F.3d 213, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 2012).  
1. 
Article III governs constitutional standing and limits 
our jurisdiction to actual “cases or controversies.”  U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2.  Article III requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate “(1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.’”  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1991)).  
Constitutional standing ensures that litigants are truly adverse 
to one another and are not merely “suitors in the courts of the 
United States.”  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 
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(1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In 
essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues.”).  “The law of Article III standing, which is 
built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the 
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political branches.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138, 1146 (2013); see also William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 222 (1988) 
(explaining that a concrete dispute “informs the court of the 
consequences of its decisions” and prevents “the anti-
majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-
making functions of the popularly elected branches”).  
The case before us concerns the injury-in-fact 
requirement.  The requisite injury-in-fact is an “invasion of a 
legally protected interest.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  That 
injury must be “particularized,” id., and “concrete in both a 
qualitative and temporal sense,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 155 (1990).   That injury must also be “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 560 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A risk of future injury may support 
standing if the threatened harm is “certainly impending,” or 
there is a “‘substantial risk’” that the harm will occur.  
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148, 1150 n.5 (quoting Monsanto Co. 
v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 (2010)). 
Standing requires that the party seeking to invoke 
federal jurisdiction “demonstrate standing for each claim he 
seeks to press.”  DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 352.  Thus, we 
do not exercise jurisdiction over one claim simply because it 
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arose “from the same ‘nucleus of operative fact’” as another 
claim.  Id.  Accordingly,  
[S]tanding is not a “mere pleading 
requiremen[t] but rather an indispensable part of 
the plaintiff’s case, each element must be 
supported in the same way as any other matter 
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence 
required at the successive stages of the 
litigation.”   
Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1276 
(2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561).   
In the context of a class action, Article III must be 
satisfied “by at least one named plaintiff.”  McNair, 672 F.3d 
at 223; see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) 
(“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a 
class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with 
the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or 
any other member of the class.”).  The Supreme Court has yet 
to comment on what Article III requires of putative, unnamed 
class members during a Rule 23 motion for class 
certification.2 
                                                 
2 The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari 
in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146, 2015 WL 
1278593, at *1 (U.S. June 8, 2015).  The second question 
presented is: “Whether a class action may be certified or 
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In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme 
Court declined to address the argument that asbestos 
exposure-only class members had no standing to pursue their 
class claims and instead began its analysis with Rule 23.  521 
U.S. 591, 612–13 (1997).  The Supreme Court agreed with 
our analysis that the settlement class’s standing issues 
“‘would not exist but for the [class-action] certification’” and 
that those issues were dispositive “because their resolution 
[was] logically antecedent to the existence of any Article III 
issues.”  Id. at 612 (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 
1996)); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 
(1999) (reasoning that the question of whether certification of 
a settlement class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on a limited fund 
rationale presented, as in Amchem, an issue of “statutory 
standing” that “should be treated first”). 
Yet considerations under Rule 23 are themselves 
procedural rules, and thus rarely can be antecedent to the 
question of whether a federal court has jurisdiction to hear a 
claim at all.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b) (authorizing the 
Supreme Court to prescribe “general rules of practice and 
procedure,” but providing that those rules “shall not abridge, 
                                                                                                             
maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action 
certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
when the class contains hundreds of members who were not 
injured and have no legal right to any damages.”  Pet. for 
Writ of Cert, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 2015 WL 
1285369, at *i (Mar. 19, 2015).  The Supreme Court may, 
therefore, answer this question during its October 2015 term.   
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enlarge or modify any substantive right”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 
(stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts”); 1 
William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 1:1 (5th 
ed. 2012) (“Rule 23 is, therefore, fundamentally a procedural 
device: it cannot ordinarily be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction and venue of federal courts.”).  What is more, the 
Supreme Court has recently explained that “statutory 
standing” is “misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as 
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate 
subject-matter jurisdiction.’”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014) 
(quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 
U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002)).  Because a federal court has a 
“bedrock obligation to examine both [its] own subject matter 
jurisdiction and that of the district courts,” Pub. Interest 
Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 
F.3d 111, 117 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1997), it is improper to “resolve 
contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt.”  
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 
(1998). 
The Supreme Court has candidly recognized the 
tension in its standing precedent: “We need not mince words 
when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not 
been defined with complete consistency in all of the various 
cases decided by this Court.”  Valley Forge Christian Coll., 
454 U.S. at 475.  One could say that Amchem stands for the 
proposition that when a federal court would deny a class 
certification motion, that court need not reach the question of 
jurisdiction.  See 521 U.S. at 612–13.  Yet that logic could 
 14 
 
result in a federal court, in many cases, reaching Rule 23 
questions before assuring itself of jurisdiction.  Even more 
problematic for this application of Amchem is the extensive 
discussion in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
that read cases that “ha[d] diluted the absolute purity of the 
rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent 
question” in a very limited manner.  523 U.S. at 101.  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that “[f]or a court to pronounce upon 
the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law 
when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for 
a court to act ultra vires.”  Id. at 101–02.  And because 
determining the answer to a Rule 23 certification motion 
involves “rigorous analysis” that may overlap with merits-
based questions, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541, 2551–52 (2011), a federal court’s analysis will rarely 
be an obvious, foregone conclusion.  Indeed, Amchem 
cautioned that “[i]f certification issues were genuinely in 
doubt . . . the jurisdictional issues would loom larger.”  521 
U.S. at 613 n.15. 
In this case, certification issues are genuinely in doubt.  
And because we will remand this matter to the District Court 
as described herein, that court may well be presented with the 
very same arguments regarding standing.  For these reasons, 
we address Volvo’s standing argument.  
2. 
In In re Prudential Insurance Co. America Sales 
Practice Litigation Agent Actions, we addressed the 
applicability of Article III to a putative class.  The case 
involved a settlement class alleging improper sales and 
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marketing practices by the life insurer Prudential.  148 F.3d 
283, 290–92 (3d Cir. 1998).  We held that once Article III 
standing “is determined vis-a-vis the named parties . . . there 
remains no further separate class standing requirement in the 
constitutional sense.”  Id. at 306–07 (quoting 1 William B. 
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 2.05 (3d ed. 1992)) 
(citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 
962 F. Supp. 450, 505–06 (D.N.J. 1997) and Allee v. 
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828 (1974)).3  We further explained 
that “absentee class members are not required to make a 
                                                 
3 The latest version of Newberg on Class Actions 
provides that “[a] class action can be maintained by one class 
representative with proper standing,” and cites to Rule 23(a) 
as authority.  2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 2:8 (5th ed. 2012); id. § 2:1 (“Once threshold 
individual standing by the class representative is met, a 
proper party to raise a particular issue is before the court; 
there is no further, separate ‘class action standing’ 
requirement.”); see also 5 Jerold S. Solovy et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice - Civil § 23.63 (3d ed. 1997) (“The named 
plaintiff in a class action must meet all the jurisdictional 
requirements to bring an individual suit asserting the same 
claims, including standing.”); 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions 
§ 4:28 (11th ed. 2014) (“In the class action context, including 
cases seeking prospective injunctive relief, as an Article III 
justiciability matter only the named plaintiff must 
demonstrate standing to assert the claims (including injury in 
fact), not the absent class members.  Individual class 
members do not need to submit evidence of personal 
standing.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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similar showing, because once the named parties have 
demonstrated they are properly before the court, ‘the issue 
[becomes] one of compliance with the provisions of Rule 23, 
not one of Article III standing.’”  Id. at 307 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 
113, 122 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 482 U.S. 656 (1987)); see also 
Hayes, 725 F.3d at 361 & n.11–12 (explaining that at the 
class certification stage when a named plaintiff’s Article III 
standing is in question, a district court must determine 
whether that named plaintiff “falls within the amended class 
definition and sustained an injury”).  Because In re 
Prudential involved a settlement class, we did not have 
occasion expressly to address whether unnamed class 
members in a litigation class must have Article III standing.4  
                                                 
4 Volvo also asks us to treat the certification of a 
settlement class in In re Prudential as distinguishable from 
that of a litigation class.  Nothing in In re Prudential, 
however, limited its reach to that of absent settlement class 
members.  See 148 F.3d at 306–07.  Nor has our application 
of In re Prudential been limited solely to settlement classes.  
See McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 243 
& n.13 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In the context of class actions, Article 
III standing ‘is determined vis-a-vis the named parties.’” 
(quoting In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 306)).  Indeed, 
Rule 23’s rigors are not relaxed as to a settlement class; we 
simply do not weigh issues of trial management as they are 
irrelevant in such a situation.  Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc. 
(Sullivan II), 667 F.3d 273, 303 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“[A] district court ‘[c]onfronted with a request for 
settlement-only class certification’ need not inquire whether 
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 We now squarely hold that unnamed, putative class 
members need not establish Article III standing.  Instead, the 
“cases or controversies” requirement is satisfied so long as a 
class representative has standing, whether in the context of a 
settlement or litigation class.  This rule is compelled by In re 
Prudential and buttressed by a historical review of 
representative actions.   
 It is well-established that “history and tradition offer a 
meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III 
empowers federal courts to consider.”  Sprint Commc’ns Co., 
L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008).  
“[G]roup litigation has a remarkably deep history” dating 
back to medieval times.  Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and 
Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective 
Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687, 687 (1997); Stephen C. 
Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern 
Class Action 21 (1987) (explaining that representative group 
litigation in medieval times was attributable to “societ[ies] 
pervasively organized in groups,” such as “villages, parishes, 
[and] guilds”).  As societies evolved, so did the characteristics 
and treatment of group litigation.  One example is the English 
Chancery practice of the “necessary parties” rule of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which “required that 
any person with an interest in the object of a suit be joined as 
                                                                                                             
the case ‘would present intractable management problems.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. 
at 620)).  Given that standing is a threshold jurisdictional 
question, there is no reason to alter its application for a 
litigation class. 
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a party.”  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical 
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1849, 1858 (1998).  The necessary parties rule had 
several exceptions, including the “impossibility exception,” 
which covered “situations in which interested parties were so 
numerous that it was practically impossible to join them all.”  
Id. at 1860; see also Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 832–33.  The 
impossibility exception permitted representative suits, such as 
“bills of peace involving a common benefit to or burden upon 
the members of the group, . . . cases involving a group having 
creditor claims against a debtor or legatee claims against an 
estate, and cases involving unincorporated associations.”  
Hazard, Jr. et al., 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1861; see also W. S. 
Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action 
by the Common Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1003 (1920) 
(discussing the gradual and partial allowance of personal 
rights of action to be asserted by representatives).  Such 
representative actions, including the most widely-recognized 
bill of peace, were post-medieval developments in the long 
history of representative litigation.  Yeazell, From Medieval 
Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action, at 24–25.    
 The history of representative actions under English law 
and how they crossed the pond to nineteenth-century America 
is marked by complexity.  Yeazell, From Medieval Group 
Litigation to the Modern Class Action, at 213–37.  Scholars 
mostly agree that representative actions under the law of this 
country can be traced back at least as far as Justice Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries on Equity Pleadings.  Id. at 216–20; 
Hazard, Jr. et al., 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1878 (citing Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, §§ 94–97, at 93–
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98 (2d ed. 1840)).  In Smith v. Swormstedt, the Supreme 
Court recognized an exception discussed by Justice Story to 
the well-established rule that litigation is typically conducted 
on behalf of named parties.  Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 288, 298 (1853).  The Court explained: 
[W]here the parties interested are numerous, 
and the suit is for an object common to them all, 
some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf 
of themselves and of the others; and a bill may 
also be maintained against a portion of a 
numerous body of defendants, representing a 
common interest.  
Id.  There was no mention of Article III, § 2—the Supreme 
Court focused on the propriety of the representative action 
itself and not whether there was truly a controversy (in the 
constitutional sense) between the feuding northern and 
southern wings of the Methodist Episcopal Church.  Id. at 303 
(“The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being 
before the court by representation, . . . there can be very little 
danger but that the interest of all will be properly protected 
and maintained.”).   
 Before the enactment of Rule 23 in 1937, federal 
courts were not consistent in their application of the equity 
rules governing representative actions.  See Equity Rule 38 
(1912); Equity Rule 48 (1842); Smith, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 
at 298 (failing to reference and contradicting the then-
governing Equity Rule 48); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 
527, 533 (1881) (making no reference to the basis for a 
representative suit but recognizing the ability of a plaintiff to 
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utilize a common fund to pay attorney’s fees); Hazard, Jr. et 
al., 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1902–10 (summarizing cases); 
Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern 
Class Action, at 219 (The legitimacy of representative actions 
“could scarcely be questioned once an authority so eminent as 
Story had recognized it, though his confusion was reflected in 
the cases.”).  Yet during this time period it was never 
suggested that putative class members were required to have 
standing or that representative actions could not present a 
proper case or controversy.   
 In 1937, the Supreme Court promulgated the first 
version of Rule 23 along with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which took effect in 1938.  See John G. Harkins, 
Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 705, 
705–09 (1997).  Rule 23 was drastically revised in 1966.  
Although the 1938 version of Rule 23 was meant to  
“encourage more frequent use of class actions,” Charles A. 
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970), in 1966 the 
Advisory Committee reworked Rule 23 and “sought to 
catalogue in ‘functional’ terms ‘those recurrent life patterns 
which call for mass litigation through representative parties,’” 
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 833 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory 
Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969)). 
 A review of the foregoing history reveals that the class 
action device treats individuals falling within a class 
definition as members of a group rather than as legally 
distinct persons.  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975) 
(reasoning that the “class of unnamed persons described in 
the certification acquired a legal status separate from the 
interest asserted by the [plaintiff]” (emphasis added)); see 
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also Hazard, Jr. et al., 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1852–53 
(analyzing the group treatment of members of a class as it 
relates to the doctrine of res judicata).  Indeed, in In re 
Prudential we reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Allee v. Medrano was instructive in providing that “standing 
must be personal to and satisfied by ‘those who seek to 
invoke the power of federal courts.’”  In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 306 (citing to Allee, 416 U.S. at 828 (quoting O’Shea, 
414 U.S. at 493)).   
 Herein lies the key: a class action is a representative 
action brought by a named plaintiff or plaintiffs.  Named 
plaintiffs are the individuals who seek to invoke the court’s 
jurisdiction and they are held accountable for satisfying 
jurisdiction.  See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 832.  Thus, a class action 
is permissible so long as at least one named plaintiff has 
standing.  See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446 & n.2 
(2009); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 264 & n.9 (1977) (“[W]e have at least one 
individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing . . . . 
Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider 
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have 
standing to maintain the suit.”); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (class action does 
not eliminate a class representative’s burden of establishing 
standing).  Requiring individual standing of all class members 
would eviscerate the representative nature of the class action.  
It would also fail to recognize that the certified class is treated 
as a legally distinct entity even though the outcome of such an 
action is binding on the class.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).  
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 What Volvo asks of this Court is arguably in conflict 
with Supreme Court precedent permitting a representative 
action to persist despite a named plaintiff’s claim becoming 
moot after certification.  In the context of the doctrine of 
mootness, the Supreme Court has already recognized the 
representative nature of the class.  For example in Sosna v. 
Iowa, the Supreme Court held a class action is not dismissed 
as moot if the named plaintiff had a live controversy when the 
suit was filed, a properly certified class action was pending, 
and there are members of the class whose claims are not 
moot.  419 U.S. at 399, 402–03.  The Court did not require 
that all members have live claims and, instead, focused on 
there needing to be a “controversy” between at least “a 
named defendant and a member of the class.”  Id. at 402; see 
also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755 
(1976) (a properly certified class action “‘clearly presented’ 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals ‘with a case or 
controversy in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the 
Constitution’” (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 398)); Holmes v. 
Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“So long as a class representative has a live 
claim at the time he moves for class certification, neither a 
pending motion nor a certified class action need be dismissed 
if his individual claim subsequently becomes moot.”). 
 The Supreme Court has also permitted representative 
standing of sorts in a variety of other contexts.  Horne, 557 
U.S. at 446 (“Because the superintendent clearly has standing 
to challenge the lower courts’ decisions, we need not consider 
whether the Legislators also have standing to do so.”); 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 
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547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (declining to decide whether the 
individually named plaintiffs had standing because “the 
presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy 
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement”).  A 
particularly apt example of this includes associational 
standing, whereby an organization may assert the rights of its 
members, provided: “(a) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to 
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and 
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”  Hunt 
v. Wa. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).  
As to the first prong of the organizational standing test, the 
Supreme Court in Hunt required only that “some Washington 
apple growers” had suffered injuries.  Id. (emphasis added); 
see also Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181–83 (reasoning that 
affidavits from some organization members were sufficient to 
establish that the association’s “members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right”).  The clear import of 
that requirement is that in the associational standing context, 
the test ensures there is an actual case and controversy 
without inquiring into the standing of every member of an 
organization.  Along this same line, the Supreme Court 
openly recognizes the ability of a State to bring suit in a 
parens patriae action.  See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (permitting a State to 
bring suit on behalf of its citizens where the State expresses a 
quasi-sovereign interest).  The focus in a parens patriae 
action is on the State, “independent of the benefits that might 
accrue to any particular individual.”  Id. at 608. 
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Volvo urges this Court to adopt the approach taken by 
some of our sister courts that require all class members to 
possess standing.  The Second and Eighth Circuits 
purportedly require absent class members to have Article III 
standing. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits potentially do too.  We 
are not persuaded. 
In Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 
2006), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class in a suit against 
professional tax advisors for improper and fraudulent tax 
counseling.  Id. at 259.  Two class objectors challenged 
certification on the grounds that the class contained members 
who had not yet been assessed tax penalties and therefore 
lacked Article III or statutory standing.  Id.  As to the 
standing challenge, the Court explained that “[w]e do not 
require that each member of a class submit evidence of 
personal standing.  At the same time, no class may be 
certified that contains members lacking Article III standing.  
The class must therefore be defined in such a way that anyone 
within it would have standing.”  Id. at 263–64 (citations 
omitted).  The Second Circuit has not expanded upon this 
declaration.  
The Eighth Circuit in Avritt v. Reliastar Life Insurance 
Co. held that a California law that permitted a single injured 
plaintiff to bring a class action on behalf of a group of 
uninjured individuals was “inconsistent with the doctrine of 
standing as applied by federal courts.”  615 F.3d 1023, 1034 
(8th Cir. 2010).  Yet the Court explained that “federal courts 
‘do not require that each member of a class submit evidence 
of personal standing.’”  Id. (quoting Denney, 443 F.3d at 
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263–64).  Reconciling this tension, the Court reasoned that 
“[a] class ‘must therefore be defined in such a way that 
anyone within it would have standing.’”  Id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting Denney, 443 F.3d at 264).  More recently in 
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., the Court 
referenced these same general principles and explained that 
the lack of an individualized injury would impact 
predominance and mean that “individual questions necessary 
to determine breach of contract and bad faith” would include 
“individual inquiries” that would “predominate over” whether 
the defendant’s processes were reasonable.  718 F.3d 773, 
779 (8th Cir. 2013).  It is, thus, not clear to us whether the 
Eighth Circuit’s standing analysis rests on Article III or Rule 
23. 
The D.C. Circuit has similarly discussed predominance 
as requiring that plaintiffs “show that they can prove, through 
common evidence, that all class members were in fact injured 
by [an] alleged conspiracy.”  In re Rail Freight Fuel 
Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (emphasis added) (reasoning that “common evidence 
[must] show all class members suffered some injury” but not 
saying that this was required pursuant to Article III).  And the 
Ninth Circuit in Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 
quoted the rule discussed in Denney.  666 F.3d 581, 594–95 
(9th Cir. 2012).  But it did so within the context of a 
predominance challenge and without detailed discussion.  Id.  
Further, the Mazza court did not expressly overrule the Ninth 
Circuit’s previous declaration that “our law keys on the 
representative party, not all of the class members.”  Stearns v. 
Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2011) 
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(analyzing a defendant’s Article III injury-in-fact argument 
while evaluating the district court’s predominance ruling).   
 We decline Volvo’s invitation to impose a requirement 
that all class members possess standing.  Class actions are 
“exception[s] to the rule that litigation is usually conducted 
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”  Byrd 
v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015).  A Rule 23(b)(3) class 
“is an ‘adventuresome innovation’ of the 1966 amendments” 
to Rule 23, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (quoting Amchem, 
521 U.S. at 614), that allows named plaintiffs to bring suit 
when the procedural protections of Rule 23 are satisfied.  The 
goal is to permit a class action that “would achieve economies 
of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of 
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing 
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results.”  Rule 23(b)(3), 1966 Amendment advisory 
committee note (emphasis added).   
 Before even getting to the point of class certification, 
however, class representatives need to present a justiciable 
claim.  As we explained in Holmes v. Pension Plan of 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., “a plaintiff who lacks the 
personalized, redressable injury required for standing to assert 
claims on his own behalf would also lack standing to assert 
similar claims on behalf of a class.”  213 F.3d at 135; see also 
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) 
(“While the proof required to establish standing increases as 
the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on 
whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake 
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in the outcome when the suit was filed.” (emphasis added) 
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)).  Combined with the Supreme 
Court’s guidance on mootness as applied to a class, we know 
that at all times during the course of a class action, there must 
be a live “case or controversy” for Article III purposes.  See 
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399, 402–03; Franks, 424 U.S. at 755. 
 Quite simply, requiring Article III standing of absent 
class members is inconsistent with the nature of an action 
under Rule 23.5  When a Rule 23(b)(3) class-action complaint 
                                                 
5 Similar reasoning has been used by our sister circuits 
that have also concluded that unnamed class members need 
not establish Article III standing.  See, e.g., In re Nexium 
Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 25, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(concluding “that the presence of a de minimis number of 
uninjured class members is permissible at class certification” 
and would not defeat commonality or predominance); 
Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020–21 (“‘In a class action, standing is 
satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements 
[of Article III]. . . . Thus, we consider only whether at least 
one named plaintiff satisfies the standing requirements.’” 
(quoting Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc))); DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 
594 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 23’s 
certification requirements neither require all class members to 
suffer harm or threat of immediate harm nor Named Plaintiffs 
to prove class members have suffered such harm.”); Mims v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 590 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“Class certification is not precluded simply because a class 
may include persons who have not been injured by the 
defendant’s conduct.”). 
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is filed, the unnamed class members are generally unknown.  
As the Seventh Circuit aptly explained: 
[A] class will often include persons who have 
not been injured by the defendant’s conduct; 
indeed this is almost inevitable because at the 
outset of the case many of the members of the 
class may be unknown, or if they are known 
still the facts bearing on their claims may be 
unknown. 
Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th 
Cir. 2009).  Only after discovery (which may be limited by a 
district court at its discretion to issues related solely to class 
certification), will the court have before it specific facts 
bearing on the class and the relevant claims.  Indeed, class 
discovery may itself focus on named representatives such that 
facts bearing on the Article III requirements for putative, 
unnamed class members never come to light.  And after class 
certification, at least for a (b)(3) class, the class members 
cannot be identified until the opt-out period pursuant to 
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) has expired.  In light of this, we do not 
expect a plaintiff to be “able to identify all class members at 
class certification.”  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.  Yet class 
representatives must meet Article III standing requirements 
the moment a complaint is filed.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
343, 358 (1996); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.   
 Volvo’s proposed requirement is likewise inconsistent 
with a Rule 23(b)(2) action.  For a Rule 23(b)(2) class, 
“certification is appropriate even if the defendant’s action or 
inaction ‘has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or a 
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few members of the class, provided it is based on grounds 
which have general application to the class.’”  Devaughn, 594 
F.3d at 1201 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), 1966 
Amendment advisory committee note).  Technically 
speaking, those (b)(2) class members may not have suffered a 
legal injury and, at best, may only have standing in light of a 
threatened future injury.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148, 
1150 n.5. 
 Additionally, a properly formulated Rule 23 class 
should not raise standing issues.  This point goes to the very 
purpose of the class action device—to save “the resources of 
both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue 
potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an 
economical fashion under Rule 23.”  Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979).  For those economies to work, it is 
axiomatic that “a class representative must be part of the class 
and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the 
class members.”  Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 156 (1982) (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. 
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  These “interests” or “injuries” are tested by 
the requirements of Rule 23.  These separate requirements 
establish the propriety of granting class-wide relief.  See 
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 395 (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment) (“More specifically, the propriety of awarding 
classwide relief (in this case, affecting the entire prison 
system) does not require a demonstration that some or all of 
the unnamed class could themselves satisfy the standing 
requirements for named plaintiffs.”).  
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 Volvo’s arguments related to the differences between 
claims among the separate statewide classes, which confuse 
distinct Rule 23 requirements, demonstrate that Volvo may 
have legitimate Rule 23 challenges.6  Rather than shoehorn 
these questions into an Article III analysis, we will continue 
to employ Rule 23 to ensure that classes are properly 
certified.  In this case, certification requires the District Court 
to determine what differing factual and legal circumstances 
might mean for the class: Can the named plaintiffs adequately 
represent the class if they owned or leased vehicles that did 
not suffer water damage pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)?  
Are the claims of the representatives typical of the class 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)?  And do any relevant 
distinctions affect the commonality and predominance 
analyses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3)?  See 
7AA Charles A. Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 
§ 1785.1 (3d ed. 2014) (“[T]he question whether [a class 
representative] may be allowed to present claims on behalf of 
others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends 
                                                 
6 Volvo’s standing argument dispatches a profusion of 
class-action buzzwords including overbreadth, class 
definition, commonality, ascertainability, as well as citation 
to the injury-in-fact required to establish Article III standing, 
the Rules Enabling Act’s dictate that federal rules may not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b), and a defendant’s “due process right to raise 
individual challenges and defenses to claims,” Carrera, 727 
F.3d at 307.  Volvo Br. 34–41.  At oral argument, it became 
apparent that Volvo was focused on the issue of standing.   
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not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and 
adequacy of representation.”). 
 Focusing on certification questions is not only 
necessary to the rigorous analysis we demand in class 
certification decisions, it is also buttressed by a close analysis 
of the “circuit split” on this issue.  Many courts are in fact 
dealing with Article III standing questions within the confines 
of Rule 23, which raises serious doubts as to whether they 
really mean to impose Article III standing as separate and 
distinct analyses in these cases.  See In re Nexium Antitrust 
Litig., 777 F.3d at 25, 30–31 (discussing uninjured class 
members in terms of the class definition, ascertainability, 
commonality, and predominance); In re Rail Freight Fuel 
Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d at 252 (predominance); 
Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020–21 (predominance); Avritt, 615 
F.3d at 1034 (class definition); Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677 
(summarizing cases on class definition); Denney, 443 F.3d at 
264 (class definition). 
 In sum, so long as a named class representative has 
standing, a class action presents a valid “case or controversy” 
under Article III.   
B. 
Although Volvo’s standing argument fails, we will 
nevertheless remand.  Volvo mentions in a footnote that the 
District Court’s certification order “did not specifically 
identify the claims certified, as required by Wachtel v. 
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 453 F.3d 179, 184 
(3d Cir. 2006).”  Volvo Br. 4 n.2.  We agree that this is a 
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problem requiring remand.  The District Court’s class 
certification opinion rejected Plaintiffs’ proposal of a 
nationwide class and the application of New Jersey law to all 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  And although the District Court directed 
that “the law of the state of each subclass should be applied to 
the subclass’s claims,” JA 77, the District Court did not 
identify which claims would be subject to class treatment.  
Volvo noted this lack of specificity and it assumed that the 
District Court meant “to certify all claims alleged in the 
[Second Amended Complaint] when it granted the alternative 
motion to certify six statewide classes.”  Volvo Br. 4 n.2.  
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court was sufficiently 
specific, citing to the District Court’s commonality analysis 
(which also did not identify specific state-law claims subject 
to class treatment), the District Court’s general reference to 
disputes of fact that justified denying Volvo’s motions for 
summary judgment, and the class certification order that 
defined the classes and class representatives. 
In Wachtel we held that “Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires 
district courts to include in class certification orders a clear 
and complete summary of those claims, issues, or defenses 
subject to class treatment.”  453 F.3d at 184.  We rejected the 
practice of issuing “memorandum opinions discussing the 
allegations in the complaint, the facts of the case, and some 
combination of the substantive requirements for class 
certification found in Rule 23(a) and (b)” that then go on to 
“treat the parameters of the class itself much more clearly and 
deliberately than the class claims, issues, or defenses.”  Id.  
We stated that Rule 23(c) “requires more specific and more 
deliberate treatment of the class issues, claims, and defenses 
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than the practice described above.”  Id. at 185.  Thus a class-
certification order or an incorporated opinion “must include 
(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the 
parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and 
(2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the 
claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.”  Id. 
at 187–88. 
Although a motion for class certification presents a 
discretionary question for a district court, the court “must 
clearly articulate its reasons, in part, so we can adequately 
review the certification decision on appeal under Rule 23(f).”  
Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(remanding because of difficulty discerning the district 
court’s analysis on typicality and adequacy).  For example, in 
Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC, we rejected the 
district court’s certification order and accompanying opinion 
because although the opinion did address “Marcus’s claims 
and the issues presented,” there was no “‘readily discernible, 
clear, and complete list’” of the claims and issues subject to 
class treatment.  687 F.3d 583, 592 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187).  We are not required to comb 
through the District Court’s opinion and layers of briefing in 
order to “cobble together the various statements . . . and reach 
a general inference as to some categories of issues that the 
District Court believes are appropriate for class treatment.”  
See Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189.   
Here Plaintiffs’ proposed classes and claims in the 
Second Amended Complaint were different from those in the 
motion for class certification.  Plaintiffs also conceded at oral 
argument that they intended for the Class Vehicles to include 
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only those which actually have a sunroof.  This lack of 
clarity, combined with the District Court’s failure to address 
in detail or list the precise claims subject to class treatment, 
means that we would be required to engage in some level of 
guesswork were we to try to piece together the class claims.  
We will not attempt to do so.  We will vacate and remand to 
the District Court so that it can provide a complete list of the 
class claims, defenses and issues for each of the six statewide 
classes in accordance with what Wachtel requires. 
C. 
Volvo disputes whether Plaintiffs satisfied 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  Volvo argues 
that the District Court erred by certifying six statewide classes 
without analyzing those classes’ claims and whether those 
claims were subject to common proof.  Although precise 
analysis of the predominance question is “best conducted 
with the benefit of a clear initial definition of the claims, 
issues, and defenses to be treated on a class basis,” see 
Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 181 n.1, the District Court erred in 
making a fundamental assumption about predominance.  That 
assumption was that our decision in Sullivan v. DB 
Investments, Inc. (Sullivan II) governed the outcome of this 
case. 
“[T]he party proposing class-action certification bears 
the burden of affirmatively demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence her compliance with the requirements of 
Rule 23.”  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.  A district court must 
rigorously analyze the evidence used to establish class 
certification in order to ensure compliance with Rule 23(a) 
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and at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b).  Comcast, 
133 S. Ct. at 1432.  This rigorous analysis may require a 
district court to address, at least in part, the merits of a 
plaintiff’s underlying claim because “class determination 
generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the 
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of 
action.”  Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Before certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class, a district court 
must evaluate whether, inter alia, “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
This predominance test asks whether common issues of law 
or fact in the case predominate over non-common, 
individualized issues of law or fact.  See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
604.  Predominance “begins, of course, with the elements of 
the underlying cause of action.”  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); see also Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (analyzing commonality in light of 
the elements of the plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination 
claims); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (“To assess predominance, 
a court at the certification stage must examine each element 
of a legal claim ‘through the prism’ of Rule 23(b)(3).” 
(quoting In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 630 (3d 
Cir. 2011))); Malak v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 746 
(3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that each element of a legal claim 
is relevant to assessing predominance).  That is “[b]ecause the 
nature of the evidence that will suffice to resolve a question 
determines whether the question is common or individual” 
and that means that “a district court must formulate some 
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prediction as to how specific issues will play out.”  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 
566 (8th Cir. 2005) and In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian 
Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009); see 
also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. 
Ct. 1184, 1191–92 (2013) (beginning the Rule 23 analysis 
with the elements of a private securities-fraud action under § 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  
“[T]he presence of individual questions does not per se 
rule out a finding of predominance.”  In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 315.  If issues common to the class overwhelm 
individual issues, predominance should be satisfied.  Amgen, 
133 S. Ct. at 1196 (explaining that predominance involves a 
qualitative assessment of common versus individualized 
questions); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 727 F.3d 796, 
801 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that predominance is not 
determined “simply by counting noses: that is, determining 
whether there are more common issues or more individual 
issues”).  Further, predominance does not require that 
common “questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor 
of the class.”  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.  “What the rule does 
require is that common questions ‘predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual [class] members.’”  Id. at 
1196 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3)). 
The District Court’s predominance analysis relied on 
Sullivan II for the proposition that “for consumer fraud 
claims, the predominance inquiry focuses on whether the 
 37 
 
defendant’s conduct was common to all class members, 
which predominates over minor individual differences 
between plaintiffs.”  JA 83 (citing Sullivan II, 667 F.3d at 
297–98).  Because “[a]ll of the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in 
the [Second Amended Complaint] are based upon defectively 
designed sound traps contained in the sunroof drainage 
systems in Class Vehicles designed and/or manufactured by 
Defendants, and Defendant[s’] uniform omissions about the 
same,” the District Court concluded that predominance was 
satisfied.  Id.  In doing so, the District Court made no 
distinction between the six statewide classes or the relevant 
claims brought by those putative classes.7 
                                                 
7 The District Court also said the predominance 
requirement was “readily met” “as discussed supra.”  JA 83.  
The only relevant previous discussion was the District 
Court’s evaluation of commonality.  The District Court stated 
that the common questions included whether: (1) “the sunroof 
drainage systems in the Class Vehicles are defective”; 
(2) “Defendants knew of the defect but failed to disclose it to 
the Class”; and (3) “the maintenance instructions were 
inadequate and/or uniformly deficient.”  JA 78.  Rejecting 
Volvo’s commonality challenge, the District Court stated that 
the “issue is whether the design of the sunroof drainage 
system was defective, not whether the existence of the alleged 
defect resulted in a clogged drain tube causing water to spill 
into the vehicle.”  JA 79.   
The District Court’s commonality analysis was of 
limited import for the question of predominance.  We have 
previously noted that the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance 
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Volvo argues that the District Court’s reliance on 
Sullivan II was in error because that decision involved a 
settlement class.  One cannot read Sullivan II as a wholesale 
departure from precedent that requires a district court to 
evaluate predominance in light of the claims asserted and 
relevant evidence.  See Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 
F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2013) (Sullivan II did not “lessen[] the 
burden required to demonstrate that putative class members 
share a common question of law or fact.”).  Indeed, Sullivan 
II cited to In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation for 
the proposition that “an examination of the elements of 
plaintiffs’ claim is sometimes necessary . . . to determine 
whether the requirements of Rule 23—namely, that the 
elements of the claim can be proved ‘through evidence 
common to the class rather than individual to its members’—
are met.”  667 F.3d at 306 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311–12).  Sullivan II thus 
applied the Hydrogen Peroxide test to fit the circumstances of 
that particular case.  Id. at 302–04.  In Sullivan II, looking at 
the class claims was “particularly unwarranted in the 
settlement context since a district court need not ‘envision the 
form that a trial’ would take, nor consider ‘the available 
evidence and the method or methods by which plaintiffs 
propose to use the evidence to prove’ the disputed element at 
                                                                                                             
requirement incorporates the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality 
requirement.  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 
516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004).  The inverse of this proposition, that 
the commonality requirement satisfies predominance, is not 
true because the “predominance criterion is far more 
demanding.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624. 
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trial.”  Id. (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) and 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312).  Sullivan II is not 
sufficiently analogous to the case at bar, nor did it obviate the 
need to evaluate the claims and evidence asserted in order to 
evaluate predominance for a litigation class.8  See 
Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2184; Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 311.  The District Court erred, therefore, by failing to 
analyze predominance in the context of Plaintiffs’ actual 
claims. 
Plaintiffs make several arguments in support of the 
District Court’s opinion, none of which are persuasive.  
Plaintiffs first argue that the District Court considered over 
1,000 pages of briefing on the motions for summary 
judgment, and that therefore, the District Court must have 
considered the individual elements of the various state-law 
claims.  Yet relying on such briefing alone hardly amounts to 
the “rigorous consideration of all the evidence and arguments 
offered by the parties” required by Rule 23.  See Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321.  Quite simply, what Plaintiffs ask 
us to do is speculate as to what the District Court must have 
                                                 
8 Volvo also argues that even if Sullivan II applies to 
Plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claims, the District Court ignored 
the predominance inquiry for the common law fraud, breach 
of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, and breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.  
For the reasons explained above, Sullivan II does not obviate 
the need for Plaintiffs to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the predominance requirement is satisfied. 
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intended.  We cannot just assume the District Court 
conducted the appropriate analysis under Rule 23.  “Rigorous 
analysis” requires more of the District Court than that, and we 
would be abdicating our role as a reviewing court were we to 
engage in the speculation Plaintiffs ask for.   
Plaintiffs also argue that Volvo’s specific examples 
related to the statewide classes do not defeat predominance.  
Like the common law claims raised by the plaintiffs in 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600–05, Plaintiffs assert class claims 
based on breach of express warranty (Count 2), breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability (Count 3), and breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count 5).  In addition, 
Plaintiffs assert claims based on the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), as was the case in Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
605–11, as well as state-specific consumer fraud claims under 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Florida, California, and Hawaii 
law. 
Volvo points to, as examples of why the District Court 
erred in not evaluating the elements of each asserted claim, 
the following potential predominance problems: 
(1) individualized proof is needed to establish a causal 
relationship between the unlawful conduct and ascertainable 
loss as required under New Jersey and Massachusetts law; 
(2) the California claims require a plaintiff to establish a duty 
to disclose an alleged defect, proof of which would vary 
based on whether a vehicle contained a yaw sensor and 
whether such disclosure would be material; (3) the implied 
warranty claims cannot satisfy predominance for reasons 
similar to those we addressed in Marcus relating to causation; 
(4) claims for a violation of an express warranty require that 
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the warranty be in place when a plaintiff experienced a water 
leak, which is only established by individualized proof; and 
(5) uniform evidence cannot be used to establish 
predominance as to both new and used owners of Class 
Vehicles because the applicable warranties between the 
groups may vary. 
Evaluating these arguments in the detail that is 
required goes beyond what was briefed before the District 
Court, beyond the District Court’s reasoning in its 
certification opinion, and beyond the briefing the panel has 
received from the parties.  We will not engage in an analysis 
of predominance in the first instance, and will therefore 
remand these questions to the District Court.  Consistent with 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600–11, the District Court should 
evaluate the relevant claims (grouping them where logical 
and appropriate) and rule on the predominance question in 
light of the claims asserted and the available evidence.9   
                                                 
9 In Marcus, a New Jersey class asserted four claims 
against BMW and Bridgestone relating to the NJCFA, breach 
of the implied warranty of merchantability, breach of 
contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  687 F.3d at 600.  Like the trial court, we 
analyzed Marcus’s common law claims together and noted 
the shared elements between the claims.  Id. at 600 & n.8.  
Despite concluding that Marcus supplied sufficient evidence 
to establish predominance as to a defect in the Bridgestone 
run-flat tires, we concluded that the individualized evidence 
required to prove proximate causation meant that the common 
law claims could not be tried on a class-wide basis.  Id. at 
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D. 
  Volvo’s final argument is that the District Court erred 
in denying the motion to reconsider the class certification 
decision in light of Comcast.  Because Comcast was 
distinguishable and the “damages issue [in this case was] 
                                                                                                             
605.  We explained that Marcus’s damages allegations “beg 
the question of what caused class members’ tires to go flat 
and need replacement.”  Id. at 604.   
As to Marcus’s claim under the NJCFA, we noted that 
the statute required a plaintiff to establish ascertainable loss.  
Id. at 605–06.  We explained that “ascertainable loss” based 
on “the cost of replacing [a] tire” could not meet the 
predominance requirement and went on to analyze loss based 
on “the value of the product [a class member] expected to 
purchase minus the value of the product they actually 
purchased.”  Id. at 606.  We explained that under that theory 
of “ascertainable loss,” a court could not apply a 
“presumption of causation” without considering both “the 
defendants’ course of conduct . . . [and] also that of the 
plaintiffs.”  Id. at 606–10.  Specifically, we held that the 
district court needed to have found “(1) that the alleged 
defects were not knowable to a significant number of 
potential class members before they purchased or leased their 
BMWs, or (2) that, even if the defects were knowable, that 
class members were nonetheless relatively uniform in their 
decisionmaking.”  Id. at 611.  We directed the district court to 
conduct this analysis in the first instance.  Id.   
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much more straightforward,” JA 91, the District Court 
declined to revisit its ruling, see id. at 90–92.   
 Comcast is inapposite to the case before us.  Comcast 
held that an antitrust litigation class could not be certified 
because the plaintiffs’ damages model did not demonstrate 
the theory of antitrust impact that the district court accepted 
for class-action treatment.  133 S. Ct. at 1433.  Because the 
antitrust claim was so limited, the Supreme Court explained: 
It follows that a model purporting to serve as 
evidence of damages in this class action must 
measure only those damages attributable to that 
theory.  If the model does not even attempt to 
do that, it cannot possibly establish that 
damages are susceptible of measurement across 
the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).  
Calculations need not be exact, see Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931), but at the class-
certification stage (as at trial), any model 
supporting a “plaintiff’s damages case must be 
consistent with its liability case, particularly 
with respect to the alleged anticompetitive 
effect of the violation.”  ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages: 
Legal and Economic Issues 57, 62 (2d ed. 
2010); see, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 [9th Cir. 
1997].  And for purposes of Rule 23, courts 
must conduct a “‘rigorous analysis’” to 
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determine whether that is so.  Wal-Mart, [131 S. 
Ct. at 2551–52]. 
Id.  Comcast went on to analyze the evidence of damages 
resulting from antitrust impact, and noted that the expert 
testimony “assumed the validity of all four theories of 
antitrust impact initially advanced by [the plaintiffs].”  Id. at 
1434.  Because the evidence could not translate the relevant 
“‘legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the 
economic impact of that event,’” the Court determined that 
common questions could not predominate over individual 
ones.  Id. at 1435 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011)). 
 Volvo relies on Comcast for the proposition that 
Plaintiffs must show that “‘damages are susceptible of 
measurement across the entire class for purposes of 
Rule 23(b)(3).’”  Volvo Br. 44 (quoting Comcast, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1433).  In so doing, Volvo selectively quotes from 
Comcast as though the Court were creating a broad-based rule 
applicable to Rule 23(b)(3).  Yet the Supreme Court 
specifically noted that it was not breaking any new ground by 
stating at the beginning of its opinion: “This case thus turns 
on the straightforward application of class-certification 
principles.”  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.  A close reading of 
the text above makes it clear that the predominance analysis 
was specific to the antitrust claim at issue.  That is eminently 
sensible.  Every question of class certification will depend on 
the nature of the claims and evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs.  What we know for sure is that whatever 
“Comcast’s ramifications for antitrust damages models or 
proving antitrust impact,” a trial court must “‘consider 
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carefully all relevant evidence and make a definitive 
determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met 
before certifying a class.’”  In re Blood Reagents Antitrust 
Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320). 
 Our reading of Comcast is consistent with decisions by 
several of our sister courts.10  That is because “[r]ecognition 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 
402 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We hold that Comcast does not mandate 
that certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding 
that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide 
basis.”); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d at 23 
(“Comcast did not require that plaintiffs show that all 
members of the putative class had suffered injury at the class 
certification stage—simply that at class certification, the 
damages calculation must reflect the liability theory.”); In re 
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 
722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Comcast 
did not impact the ability of a trial court to certify a liability 
class and then later consider class damages under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(c)(4)), cert. denied sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 
134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); Butler, 727 F.3d at 800–01 
(emphasizing that Comcast focused on “the requirement of 
predominance and on its having to be satisfied by proof 
presented at the class certification stage rather than deferred 
to later stages of the litigation” (citing Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 
1432–33)); Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. 
XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(vacating and remanding a district court’s certification 
decision to more fully consider the predominance 
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that individual damages calculations do not preclude class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”  
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on 
Class Actions § 4:54 (5th ed. 2012)).  Had the District Court 
ruled as Volvo requested, denying certification on that basis 
                                                                                                             
requirement, but noting that even after Comcast “there are 
ways to preserve the class action model in the face of 
individualized damages”); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 
F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting Comcast as 
requiring that “the plaintiffs must be able to show that their 
damages stemmed from the defendant’s actions that created 
the legal liability” and that rule is satisfied where “damages 
will be calculated based on the wages each employee lost due 
to Medline’s  unlawful practices”). 
The D.C. Circuit has interpreted Comcast as requiring 
proof of class-wide damages in the context of an antitrust 
class, explaining: “It is now indisputably the role of the 
district court to scrutinize the evidence before granting 
certification, even when doing so ‘requires inquiry into the 
merits of the claim.’”  In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge 
Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d at 253 (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1433).  The Court went on to summarize that the specific 
proffered expert models were essential to the plaintiffs’ 
evidence of class-wide injury, concluding “[n]o damages 
model, no predominance, no class certification.”  Id.  One 
could read this analysis out of context as saying that all 
classes require a damages model; however, like Comcast, the 
analysis as to class-wide damages was specific to that 
antitrust claim.    
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alone would have amounted to an abuse of discretion.  See 
Roach, 778 F.3d at 409.  In sum, and as explained by the Fifth 
Circuit, it is “a misreading of Comcast” to interpret it as 
“preclud[ing] certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in any case 
where the class members’ damages are not susceptible to a 
formula for classwide measurement.”  In re Deepwater 
Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815 & n.104.   
IV. 
 The difficult questions raised in this appeal are 
resolved by a return to the basics of Rule 23.  We will vacate 
and remand the District Court’s class certification decision to 
allow the District Court to define the class membership, 
claims, and defenses, and so that it may rigorously analyze 
predominance in the first instance. 
